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1. Introduction
The agency problem between controlling shareholders and dispersed minority 
shareholders in modern corporations has drawn considerable research attention in the 
economics, ﬁnance, and accounting ﬁelds in recent years. Controlling shareholders, who 
have control power and insider information, can divert resources away from companies 
under their control for their own benefit to the detriment of minority shareholder 
interests. This phenomenon is called tunneling or self-dealing (Johnson et al., 2000b; 
Djankov et al., 2008).
An important channel of self-dealing is through intercorporate loans. For example, 
La Porta et al. (2003) find that in Mexico, banks make loans to firms controlled by 
the bank owners on preferential terms. Research into the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 
reveals similar loan practices (Johnson et al., 2000a). Self-dealing can also involve 
personal loans, as in the case of Adelphia Communications and the Rigas family, in 
which members of the controlling family took out loans from the company to pay for 
personal expenses. 
In the Chinese market, Jiang et al. (2009) document vast amount of loans from listed 
ﬁrms to their controlling shareholders, which are reported as ‘Other Receivables’ in the 
ﬁnancial reports of these ﬁrms. 
However, self-dealing through corporate loans can take more subtle forms. We study 
one such form in this paper – plain vanilla accounts receivable. Accounts receivable in 
Chinese listed ﬁrms have two features that are rarely seen in other markets. First, the 
magnitude of accounts receivable due from controlling shareholders is great, partly 
because many Chinese listed ﬁrms are carve-outs from parent companies in their initial 
public oﬀerings. Consequently, the outputs of listed ﬁrms tend to supply a downstream 
division of their parent companies, which creates a large dollar amount of accounts 
receivable due from the parent companies. Second, these accounts receivable can remain 
on the balance sheets of listed ﬁrms for a long time, even up to ﬁve years. These two 
features combine to seriously damage ﬁrm value. 
In this paper, we document the magnitude of accounts receivable in Chinese 
listed ﬁrms, and then examine its impact on the future earnings and stock returns of 
these firms. From 2000 to 2004, Chinese listed firms reported accounts receivable 
that constituted on average 12% of total assets, of which 26.9% were more than 12 
months old. However, Chinese listed firms rarely make an allowance for bad debts 
against receivables (including accounts receivable) due from controlling shareholders 
and their aﬃliated companies. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a great magnitude of accounts 
receivable (high accounts receivable ﬁrms) underperform compared to those with a small 
magnitude of accounts receivable (low accounts receivable ﬁrms) in terms of current 
proﬁtability and proﬁtability in three years. Investors initially appear to underreact to the 
information about accounts receivable, and mispricing is corrected only in the following 
year when more earnings information is disclosed. These results hold for both univariate 
and multivariate analysis where other ﬁrm characteristics are controlled. 
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The accrual anomaly does not explain the negative relationship between a great 
magnitude of current accounts receivable (an important part of a high level of 
accruals) and low future earnings and stock returns. We ﬁnd that current earnings are 
actually lower among high receivable ﬁrms than among low receivable ones, contrary 
to the prediction of the accrual anomaly. However, our results are consistent with 
the expropriation of listed firms and minority shareholders through trade credit and 
‘occupation’ of the funds of listed ﬁrms for a long time by controlling shareholders. 
This paper adds to the growing literature on self-dealing, especially in China. Earlier 
studies focus on more transparent forms of self-dealing including the direct diversion 
of cash (Jiang et al., 2009) and related party transactions (Cheung et al., 2006; Jian 
and Wong, 2006),1 which are explicitly prohibited and tightly regulated, respectively, 
in China. For example, listed ﬁrms’ making outright loans to controlling shareholders, 
reported as ‘Other Receivables,’ was largely eliminated in China after 2006 following a 
government crackdown on this practice. However, the incentive to engage in self-dealing 
remains. It is very likely that controlling shareholders now rely on other forms of self-
dealing, such as extracting trade credit from listed ﬁrms. Thus, our study draws to the 
attention of investors and regulators this more subtle form of self-dealing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background and literature review. Section 3 reports the empirical analyses, and Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypothesis 
Development
2.1. Self-dealing in China
Studies of agency problems have traditionally focused on the conflict of interest 
between management and a diﬀused group of shareholders (eg, Berle and Means, 1932; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, more recently, considerable attention has been 
paid to the conﬂict of interest between controlling shareholders and dispersed minority 
shareholders, a phenomenon that is typical in emerging or transitional economies (eg, 
La Porta et al., 1999). In such economies, concentrated ownership is commonplace, and 
traditional investor protection and corporate governance mechanisms are weak (eg, La 
Porta et al., 2000). Taken together, these factors create an environment that is highly 
conducive to self-dealing by controlling shareholders.
China is a typical example of a transitional economy. Following the accession to 
power of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, market mechanisms and corporate 
1 Accounts receivable are included in some of these early studies (Jian and Wong, 2006), but represent only a 
small portion of related party transactions. Furthermore, other related party transactions may not be loans.
JIGAO ZHU AND GUOHUA JIANG62
shareholding were abandoned in China. Since 1978, a number of reforms have been 
implemented to take China from being a centrally planned economy to a market 
one. Shareholding companies have emerged, which allow the participation of private 
investors, and stock exchanges were opened in 1990 and 1991 to facilitate the ﬁnancing 
of the economy. The majority of listed ﬁrms have been restructured from former state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and many are carve-outs from a parent group, either a state 
entity or a private enterprise, which retains a controlling stake in the listed ﬁrm. Prior 
to 2006, shares owned by controlling shareholders were mostly non-tradable, which 
deprived controlling shareholders of the beneﬁts of share price appreciation. 
A number of recent studies examine self-dealing in China. Cheung et al. (2006) study 
stock price reactions to announcements of related party transactions (RPTs) by Hong 
Kong-listed mainland China ﬁrms, and ﬁnd that market reactions tend to be negative, 
which suggests that controlling shareholders divert resources away from listed firms 
through RPTs. Jian and Wong (2006) provide evidence that corporate insiders use RPTs 
to prop up the earnings of and tunnel resources from listed ﬁrms. Their examination of 
related sales, lending, and investment between listed ﬁrms and controlling shareholders 
reveals that these transactions are used to meet regulatory earnings targets (propping), 
and that more propping leads to more tunneling (Jian and Wong, 2006). 
Jiang et al. (2009) document a more transparent form of self-dealing in China, which 
is rare elsewhere, namely, controlling shareholders directly taking money out of listed 
ﬁrms in the form of loans. They ﬁnd that these loans are negatively related to the future 
earnings and stock returns of listed ﬁrms, which indicates that self-dealing is detrimental 
to the interests of minority shareholders (Jiang et al., 2009). 
In this paper, we study a more subtle form of loans from listed ﬁrms to controlling 
shareholders – trade credit. Because many Chinese listed ﬁrms are carve-outs, related 
party sales are common and their dollar amount is large, which results in a great 
magnitude of accounts receivable due from controlling shareholders and their aﬃliates. 
These related party accounts receivable tend to remain outstanding for a long time, 
which hurts ﬁrm proﬁtability. They potentially represent another channel that facilitates 
self-dealing in China. 
2.2. Self-dealing through Trade Credit
Extending trade credit to customers is a common, if arms-length, way of doing 
business. When trade credit is extended to controlling shareholders or their aﬃliates, 
a number of issues arise that can jeopardize the fairness of the transaction, including 
whether the transaction price is a fair market price, the credit terms are reasonable, and 
receivables are collected in a timely manner. Because controlling shareholders potentially 
dictate the operational decisions of firms, extending trade credit could facilitate self-
dealing, which harms the interests of minority shareholders.
In China, self-dealing through trade credit is possible because 1) trade credit 
represents a large proportion of total ﬁrm assets, 2) trade credit is of long duration, and 3) 
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an allowance for uncollectible debts is rarely made against accounts receivable due from 
controlling shareholders, regardless of how long the accounts have been outstanding.
After China established stock exchanges, regulators initially maintained tight control 
over the listing process. They deliberately kept the number of listed shares low. For 
example, before 2001, regulators annually set the total number of shares to be issued 
each year, and quotas were allocated to provinces and central government ministries. 
Each province or ministry then allocated its quota to ﬁrms within its jurisdiction. Only 
these ﬁrms were able to go public (within the quota) and be listed on stock exchanges. 
Thus, to meet the quota requirement, many ﬁrms had to carve out a part of the ﬁrm 
(normally the productive part) to list while the rest of the ﬁrm remained in the parent 
group. The practice continues today of a newly listed ﬁrm continuing to supply output 
to the downstream divisions of the parent group, as it did before listing, which inevitably 
results in a large dollar amount of trade credit.
For example, Wu Liang Ye (stock code: 000858) is a carve-out from the Wu Liang 
Ye Group. The listed Wu Liang Ye is mainly the production division of this famous 
brand of Chinese liquor. The sales division remains with the Wu Liang Ye Group, which 
is eﬀectively the controller of the listed ﬁrm. In 2007, 53.68% of the output from the 
listed ﬁrm was sold to the sales division of the parent group, the Wu Liang Ye Import 
and Export Company.2 
In our sample, which covers the 2000-2004 period, total accounts receivable 
amount to 12% of the total assets of listed ﬁrms, and the interquartile range is from 
4.2% to 17%. Although limited data availability prevents us from identifying the exact 
proportion of accounts receivable due from controlling shareholders, examples such as 
the Wu Liang Ye case and anecdotal evidence suggest that it is quite substantial.
Accounts receivable due from controlling shareholders tend to be longstanding, and 
an allowance for uncollectible accounts is rarely made. The credit history of Chinese 
businesses is sub par. During the transition from a planned and government-owned 
economy to a market one, uncollectible trade credit has constantly been a problem. A 
new term, ‘triangle debt,’ has been coined to describe the situation where one ﬁrm owes 
money to another, which in turn owes money to yet other ﬁrms. In the late 1990s, the 
credit problem resulted in a huge number of non-performing loans among Chinese 
banks. The government assumed the bad loans through equity injection into the banks 
and removed the loans from bank balance sheets. 
Such a credit environment is likely to harm listed ﬁrms. The ﬁrst consequence is that 
accounts receivable tend to be longstanding. A cursory examination of the balance sheets 
of Chinese listed ﬁrms reveals that accounts receivable stay in the balance sheets for as 
long as ﬁve years. In our sample, accounts receivable aged between 13 and 24 months 
comprised 10.8% of total accounts receivable, those aged between 25 and 36 months, 
2 This ﬁgure is computed based on the listed ﬁrm’s annual report. It is also widely reported that sales to the 
parent group are made at discounted prices.
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5.8%, and those aged more than 36 months, 10.3%. In total, accounts receivable more 
than a year old represented 26.9% of total accounts receivable, not including those 
receivables that had been written off. Such longstanding overdue accounts amount 
to interest-free long-term loans to customers, including controlling shareholders, and 
obviously harm shareholder interests, especially those of minority shareholders.
In developed economies, trade credit over a year old tends to be written off 
completely; however, this is not the case in China. Chinese listed firms make an 
insufficient bad debt allowance against accounts receivable, and nearly none against 
receivables (including accounts receivable) that are due from controlling shareholders. 
This leads to another negative eﬀect of a sub par credit environment on listed ﬁrms – the 
inﬂation of corporate earnings. 
However, this environment is not the only reason that firms do not make a bad 
debt allowance against accounts receivable. Government regulations, in fact, discourage 
listed firms from making a bad debt allowance, especially against receivables due 
from controlling shareholders. On October 26, 1999, the Ministry of Finance issued 
Directive on Accounting Policy No. 35,3 which sets a high threshold for listed ﬁrms 
to recognize bad debt expense. For example, for their overdue debts to be written oﬀ, 
customers must have ﬁled for bankruptcy, be experiencing severe cash ﬂow problems, or 
have experienced disastrous events, or the overdue accounts must be more than ﬁve years 
old. The Directive prohibits writing oﬀ receivables due from controlling shareholders in 
any event, and requires ﬁrms to hold employees who made the trade responsible for the 
losses if a substantial amount of trade credit becomes uncollectible.
In summary, the foregoing observations suggest that controlling shareholders in 
China use trade credit to tunnel resources away from listed ﬁrms. These shareholders owe 
listed ﬁrms a substantial amount in accounts receivable, which tend to be outstanding 
for a long time. Also, listed ﬁrms make an insuﬃcient, and more often no, bad debt 
allowance against accounts receivable in general, and accounts receivable due from 
controlling shareholders in particular. Consequently, a substantial amount of the funds 
of listed ﬁrms is used by controlling shareholders for a long period, interest free, which 
hurts ﬁrm proﬁtability and harms the interests of minority shareholders.
2.3. Three Cases of Self-dealing through Trade Credit4
Case A: San Jiu Yi Yao (stock code: 000999)
The controlling shareholder, the San Jiu Group, owned more than 70% of San 
Jiu Yi Yao’s common shares. From 2000 to 2004, total accounts receivable routinely 
constituted more than 10% of total assets. The bad debt allowance rate was as low as 
3 财会Ϫ[1999]35号《股份有限公司会计制度有关会计处理问题补充规定》.
4 The details of these cases are available from the authors upon request.
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2% for accounts receivable aged less than 12 months, and as high as 30% for those aged 
more than 36 months. However, a footnote in San Jiu Yi Yao’s 2001 report speciﬁcally 
indicated that a bad debt allowance was not to be made against receivables due from 
controlling shareholders. By the end of 2004, total receivables (accounts and other 
receivables) due from controlling shareholders accounted for 45% of the firm’s total 
assets. San Jiu Yi Yao’s external auditor issued a qualiﬁed opinion every year after 2001 
on the grounds that it could not judge the impact of the outstanding receivables on the 
ﬁrm’s operation. However, the board of directors insisted that the receivables due from 
controlling shareholders would be collected and did not approve making an allowance 
for bad debts. Unfortunately, the minority shareholders of San Jiu Yi Yao never saw these 
receivables collected in cash. In 2007, with receivables due from controlling shareholders 
mounting and under pressure from regulators and minority shareholders, the controlling 
shareholders took a debt-for-assets swap to settle part of the receivables and transfer 
control to Hua Run Group.
Case B: Zheng Zhou Mei Dian (stock code: 600121)
Zheng Zhou Mei Dian is a typical carve-out. In 1997, the Zheng Mei Group carved 
out its coal production part, which become Zheng Zhou Mei Dian, and listed the latter 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. After the IPO, the Zheng Mei Group owned more 
than 70% of Zheng Zhou Mei Dian’s common shares. Zheng Zhou Mei Dian’s main 
product was coal. After listing, it never established its own distribution channel. Thus, 
nearly 80% of the listed ﬁrm’s outputs were sold through the sales division of the Zheng 
Mei Group. However, the Zheng Mei Group was slow to pay Zheng Zhou Mei Dian, 
and by 2004, the Group owed it RMB560 million, accounting for 43.7% of the latter’s 
2004 revenues. The listed ﬁrm did not report whether it had made a bad debt allowance 
against receivables due from the Zheng Mei Group, but that is unlikely given that the 
total bad debt allowance accounted for only about 5% of total receivables before 2005. 
The allowance was likely to have been made against receivables due from non-related 
customers, which bought the other 20% of Zheng Zhou Mei Dian’s outputs. The 
minority shareholders did not see the majority of these receivables paid back in cash. 
On December 28, 2005, a debt-for-equity swap took place, and Zheng Zhou Mei Dian 
wrote oﬀ RMB465 million worth of common shares owned by the Zheng Mei Group 
and thus forgave an equivalent dollar amount of receivables due from the Group.
Case C: Lu Bei Hua Gong (stock code: 600727)
Although in both Cases A and B, controlling shareholders take up precious capital 
of the listed ﬁrms for a long time in the form of outstanding accounts receivable and 
minority shareholders of the listed ﬁrms never see the money paid back in cash, the 
argument can still be made that ex ante, this form of loans represents an efficient 
internal capital market arrangement whereby controlling shareholders can tunnel listed 
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ﬁrms in times of need and prop up listed ﬁrms when the latter require help. Of course, 
this argument does not hold ex post in the two abovementioned cases, because the 
controlling shareholders are unable to pay back the loans.
In the case of the Lu Bei Hua Gong, we are able to access the ﬁnancial data of its 
controlling shareholder.5 These data show that although Lu Bei Hua Gong suffered 
losses, the controlling shareholder, the Lu Bei Group, reported increasing proﬁtability. 
Nevertheless, the Lu Bei Group and its aﬃliates owed Lu Bei Hua Gong a substantial 
amount in loans in the form of accounts receivable, which is inconsistent with the 
internal capital market argument but consistent with the self-dealing argument. 
Prior to 2005, the Lu Bei Group owned about 50% of Lu Bei Hua Gong’s common 
shares, a figure that declined to 27.9% after 2006, which remained the controlling 
stake. From 2002 to 2008, the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets increased 
from 4.39% to 25.07%, with increases occurring mostly in 2006, 2007, and 2008. By 
the end of 2008, receivables due from the controlling shareholder, aﬃliates, and other 
related parties account for 80% of total accounts receivable. During the same period, 
Lu Bei Hua Gong’s return on assets (ROA) decreased from 2.89% to -29.18%, and its 
cash ROA (operating cash ﬂow divided by total assets) decreases from 5.07% to -7.59%. 
Because of two consecutive annual losses, the listed ﬁrm’s stock was placed under special 
treatment status (ST). However, the ROA of the controlling shareholder, the Lu Bei 
Group, increased nearly monotonically from 7.2% in 2002 to 20.36% in 2007, and its 
cash ROA increased from 15.88% in 2004 to 25.42% in 2007.
2.4. Hypothesis Development
In summary, anecdotal evidence and case studies strongly suggest that in China, 
controlling shareholders engage in self-dealing activities by extracting trade credit from 
listed ﬁrms, and thus expropriate value from minority shareholders. This form of self-
dealing is harder to recognize than the more transparent ‘Other receivables,’ which 
is explicitly prohibited by regulations. Trade credit is a part of the normal operating 
activities of any business, and traditionally, the outputs of listed ﬁrms tend to be sold via 
the sales division of controlling shareholders. China’s sub par credit environment makes 
self-dealing through trade credit less distinguishable from the overall credit problem in 
the marketplace. 
However, the great magnitude and long duration of trade credit to controlling 
shareholders seriously hurt the proﬁtability of listed ﬁrms, and reduce the value of shares 
owned by minority shareholders. Thus, in this paper, we test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Trade credit is negatively related to the future proﬁtability of listed ﬁrms. 
5 China Statistical Bureau publishes annually the ﬁnancial data of large business ﬁrms.
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Hypothesis 1b: Trade credit is negatively related to the future stock returns of listed 
ﬁrms. 
3. Empirical Analyses
3.1. Data and Preliminary Analyses
Our sample period is from 2000 to 2004. We start at 2000 because prior to 1999, 
the Ministry of Finance did not have a clear policy on bad debt allowances for listed 
ﬁrms. New policies issued in 1999 and 2000 required listed ﬁrms to make a bad debt 
allowances and also gave guidelines on assessing bad debts. We stop at 2004 because 
we examine accounting performance and stock returns over three years. From all listed 
ﬁrms, we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms, ﬁrst-year IPO ﬁrms, and ﬁrms without the necessary 
financial data. In total, we have 4,882 firm-year observations, ranging from 757 
observations in 2000 to 1,117 observations in 2004. In the analyses below, we winsorize 
the main ﬁnancial variables (not including future returns) at the 1% and the 99% level 
to minimize the inﬂuence of outliers.
We collect gross accounts receivable, in total and by age of receivables outstanding. 
Our main purpose is to investigate whether accounts receivable due from controlling 
shareholders and affiliates are negatively related to the future profitability and stock 
returns of listed ﬁrms; however, ﬁnancial disclosure during our sample period does not 
allow us to systematically collect disaggregate information on accounts receivable. Thus, 
we rely on total accounts receivable to do our analyses. The problem with this approach 
is that accounts receivable include those from parties unrelated to the controlling 
shareholders, and thus the extent of self-dealing through trade credit is overstated. We 
take two approaches to minimize this problem.
First, our conclusions are drawn based on portfolio analyses where portfolios are 
constructed by sorting ﬁrms annually based on measures of total receivables (divided by 
total assets, ARC). Speciﬁcally, we compare whether low and high ARC portfolios diﬀer 
signiﬁcantly in terms of future accounting proﬁt and stock returns, with and without 
controlling for other firm characteristics. Ex ante, we do not have reason to believe 
that high ARC firms will have a larger portion of receivables due from controlling 
shareholders than low ARC ﬁrms. If this conjecture is true, then the results of sorting 
based on total receivables will be similar to those of sorting based on receivables due 
from controlling shareholders. 
Second, in the main analyses below, we report results using industry-adjusted 
accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by total assets (IARC2)6 to 
sort ﬁrms. Accounts receivable that are outstanding for more than two years are more 
6 Using total accounts receivable, receivables aged more than 12 months, and receivables aged more than 36 
months produces similar results.
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likely to be attributed to controlling shareholders and their aﬃliates, whereas accounts 
receivable due from unrelated parties tend to be collected in a timely manner.7
Table 1. Deﬁnition of Main Variables
Variable Deﬁnitions
ART Accounts receivable turnover
ARR0 Accounts receivable aged less than 12 months, divided by total accounts receivable
ARR1 Accounts receivable aged between 13 and 24 months, divided by total accounts receivable
ARR2 Accounts receivable aged between 25 and 36 months, divided by total accounts receivable
ARR3 Accounts receivable aged more than 36 months, divided by total accounts receivable
ARC Total accounts receivable/total assets 
IARC2 Industry-adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months, divided by total assets
IARP2 Industry-adjusted ratio of bad debt allowance to accounts receivable aged more than 24 months
ROA Return on assets
AROA Average of ROA in three succeeding years
FRET Raw returns in the 12 months following portfolio formation; portfolios are formed at the end of the fourth month after the ﬁscal year end
SARET Size-adjusted returns
MARET1 Market-adjusted returns (relative to the index of the exchange in which a stock is traded)
MARET2 Market-adjusted returns (relative to a comprehensive index for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges) 
REV Total revenue (in million RMB)
REC Accounts receivable (in million RMB)
SIZE Natural logarithm of the beginning of period total assets
GROWTH Revenue growth rate over the previous period
LEV Leverage ratio; total liability divided by total assets
CF Operating cash ﬂow divided by total assets
BM Book-to-market ratio
7 We examine the top 20 ﬁrms in terms of IARC2 in 2002, and ﬁnd that 40% of them received an unclean 
auditor opinion, and that 40% of them entered ST status in the next three years, which further conﬁrms that 
IARC2 reasonably captures the self-dealing nature of related party receivables.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Main Variables
N Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
REV 4822 1761.46 11773.19 0.00 307.84 647.27 1400.10 590632.00 
REC 4882 219.82 476.73 0.01 48.40 114.08 245.23 13427.00 
ROA 4882 0.027 0.055 -0.248 0.010 0.031 0.053 0.180 
SIZE 4882 21.008 0.837 19.075 20.450 20.932 21.523 23.787 
GROWTH 4882 0.254 0.546 -0.724 -0.003 0.162 0.375 4.464 
LEV 4882 0.454 0.168 0.082 0.331 0.456 0.578 0.873 
CF 4882 0.055 0.092 -0.350 0.008 0.051 0.103 0.372 
Panel B: Accounts Receivable
ART 4882 19.13 55.27 0.43 2.91 5.64 12.37 561.76 
ARR0 4882 0.731 0.228 0.000 0.602 0.791 0.911 1.000 
ARR1 4882 0.108 0.117 0.000 0.025 0.074 0.154 1.000 
ARR2 4882 0.058 0.088 0.000 0.007 0.030 0.075 1.000 
ARR3 4882 0.103 0.156 0.000 0.009 0.042 0.126 1.000 
ARC 4882 0.120 0.100 0.001 0.042 0.096 0.170 0.564 
Table 1 deﬁnes the main variables used in our analyses. Table 2 reports the summary 
statistics of our sample firms. On average, our sample firms report RMB 1,761.46 
million in revenue and RMB 219.82 million in gross accounts receivable. Thus, on 
average, gross accounts receivable outstanding constitute 12.5% of the revenue of listed 
ﬁrms. The mean (median) ROA of our sample ﬁrms is 2.7% (3.1%),8 and amazingly, 
the mean (median) ratio of gross accounts receivable to total assets (ARC) is 12.0% 
(9.6%). Put diﬀerently, on average, accounts receivable outstanding are more than four 
times the ﬁrm proﬁts in Chinese listed ﬁrms over a ﬁve-year period. Another interesting 
observation from Table 2 is that cash earnings (CF, operating cash ﬂow divided by total 
assets) are actually higher than earnings (ROA). Over a ﬁve-year period, cash earnings (as 
a percentage of total assets) are greater annually than the reported total earnings by 2.8%. 
One wonders where the cash generated by operations went. One likely explanation 
is that controlling shareholders took the cash away from listed firms through ‘Other 
Receivables’ (Jiang et al., 2009).
The mean (median) ratio of accounts receivable aged less than 12 months to total 
accounts receivable (ARR0) is 73.1% (79.1%), 10.8% (7.4%) for accounts receivable 
aged between 13 months and 24 months (ARR1), 5.8% (3.0%) for accounts receivable 
aged between 25 months and 36 months (ARR2), and 10.3% (4.2%) for accounts 
receivable aged more than 36 months (ARR3). Thus, on average, 26.9% of total 
accounts receivable are outstanding for more than a year, and represent 3.2% of total 
8 The mean and median ROA of our sample are similar to those reported by Niu et al. (2007).
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assets (26.9%*12.0%). Again, if ﬁrms wrote oﬀ accounts receivable more than a year 
old, then a proﬁt year would into a loss year for the average ﬁrm.
3.2. Accounts Receivable, Future Proﬁtability, and Stock Returns
Each year between 2000 and 2004, we sort sample ﬁrms based on IARC2, which is 
industry-adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by total assets. 
We use an industry-adjusted measure to avoid concentration in certain deciles with a 
limited number of industries, which eliminates the industry eﬀect of receivables-related 
policies. Because our time series is short, we pool together observations from the same 
deciles from all ﬁve years. This treatment creates serial correlation among observations 
across years; thus, in the multivariate regressions, we control for the year effect, and 
adjust the t-statistics using the standard errors corrected for clustering at the ﬁrm level 
(Peterson, 2009).
Table 3. Mean Firm Characteristics of Deciles Formed Based on Accounts Receivable
Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest
ROA 0.047 0.040 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.022 0.015 0.012 -0.008 
SIZE 21.19 20.98 20.91 21.14 21.10 21.09 20.99 20.97 20.87 20.80 
GROWTH 0.257 0.295 0.321 0.301 0.273 0.262 0.220 0.206 0.208 0.194 
LEV 0.427 0.420 0.438 0.451 0.454 0.420 0.457 0.467 0.484 0.524 
CF 0.076 0.060 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.062 0.051 0.044 0.039 0.035 
ARC 0.107 0.106 0.095 0.087 0.081 0.082 0.113 0.130 0.169 0.228 
ART 29.185 19.082 20.620 21.203 40.554 32.842 13.131 7.092 4.912 2.937 
REV 2496.64 2068.28 2191.09 2247.11 2580.02 1426.34 1428.48 1178.21 1163.63 840.33 
REC 234.18 204.51 199.76 216.36 191.68 145.51 185.04 216.41 271.58 333.80 
Note: Each year between 2000 and 2004, we sort all sample ﬁrms into ten deciles based on IARC2, which is industry-
adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by total assets. All observations for the same deciles 
between 2000 and 2004 are pooled together before means are calculated.
Table 3 reports the ﬁrm characteristics of the ten deciles. First, high IARC2 ﬁrms 
tend to have a high level of total receivables (ARC). Total accounts receivable comprise 
10.7% of ﬁrm assets in the lowest IARC2 decile. This ratio actually decreases to 8.2% 
in the sixth decile before increasing to 22.8% in the highest IARC2 decile. Accounts 
receivable turn over faster in the low IARC2 deciles (ART, 29.185 times in the lowest 
IARC2 decile) than in the high IARC2 deciles (only 2.937 times in the highest IARC2 
decile). This result indicates that the large amount of receivables in the high IARC2 
deciles is not supported by large sales; rather, these are receivables that have been 
outstanding (and accumulating) for some time. This observation is further supported 
by the relative magnitude of revenue versus receivables. In the lowest IARC2 decile, 
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accounts receivable constitute 9.3% of revenue, whereas in the highest IARC2 decile, 
they comprise nearly 40% of revenue. 
High IARC2 is negatively related to current-period ROA and cash earnings (CF, 
operating cash ﬂow divided by total assets). Return on assets decreases from 4.7% in the 
lowest IARC2 decile to -0.8% in the highest IARC2 decile, while cash earnings decrease 
from 7.6% to 3.5%. These ﬁndings provide preliminary evidence that a great magnitude 
of accounts receivable points to damage done to listed firms by the self-dealing of 
controlling shareholders.9
Table 4. Accounts Receivable and Future Proﬁtability
ROA CF
T T+1 T+2 T+3 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Low 0.047 0.039 0.035 0.037 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.071
2 0.040 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.060 0.059 0.069 0.067
3 0.037 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.061 0.063 0.056 0.067
4 0.033 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.059 0.054 0.056 0.053
5 0.033 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.057 0.055 0.058 0.056
6 0.036 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.062 0.065 0.072 0.065
7 0.022 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.051 0.048 0.053 0.061
8 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.044 0.043 0.051 0.052
9 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.039 0.045 0.040 0.048
High -0.008 -0.006 0.003 0.010 0.035 0.046 0.048 0.049
Low-High
(t-value)
0.055 0.045 0.032 0.027 0.041 0.031 0.028 0.022
(13.90)*** (10.98)*** (8.28)*** (6.76)*** (7.18)*** (5.62)*** (4.81)*** (3.61)***
Note: Each year between 2000 and 2004, we sort all sample ﬁrms into ten deciles based on IARC2, which is industry-
adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by total assets. We then track ROA and Cash 
Earnings (CF, total assets normalized) of each decile in the sorting year and three succeeding years. All observations 
for the same deciles between 2000 and 2004 are pooled together before the means are calculated. ***, **, and * 
represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
In Table 4, we report the ROA and CF of the ten IARC2 deciles during the 
sorting year (year T), and three succeeding years. In year T, the lowest IARC2 
decile reports 4.7% ROA, which is 5.5% higher than the -0.8% ROA of the 
highest IARC2 decile, and the difference is statistically significant. In addition, the 
9 The argument can be made that the results in this paper are also theoretically consistent with the accrual 
anomaly (eg, Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001). The accrual anomaly would interpret high IARC2 ﬁrms as being low 
earnings persistence firms as accounts receivable are a major part of accrued earnings. Because of the low 
earnings persistence, high IARC2 ﬁrms experience low future earnings and low stock returns as we document 
below. However, the accrual anomaly would require that high IARC2 ﬁrms have high current earnings, not low 
current earnings as we document in Table 3.
JIGAO ZHU AND GUOHUA JIANG72
lowest IARC2 decile outperforms the highest one in ROA by 4.5% in year T+1, 
3.2% in year T+2, and 2.7% in year T+3, and all of the differences are statistically 
significant. In any of the four years, as IARC2 increases, ROA decreases nearly 
monotonically. We also observe a similar trend in cash earnings. In terms of CF, the 
lowest IARC2 decile outperforms the highest one by 4.1% in year T, 3.1% in year 
T+1, 2.8% in year T+2, and 2.2% in year T+3. Thus, high IARC2 firms not only 
report lower accrued earnings, they are also less capable of generating operating cash 
flow. 
Investors do not seem to fully understand that IARC2 is negatively related to future 
proﬁtability (Bernard and Thomas, 1995; Burgstahler et al., 2002). Table 5 reports the 
size-adjusted returns and two measures of market-adjusted returns for the ten IARC2 
deciles in three succeeding years. In year T+1, the lowest IARC2 decile ﬁrms earn 3.9% 
size-adjusted returns, beating the highest IARC2 decile firms (-1.4%) by 5.3%, and 
the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. When we use the market-adjusted returns, the 
lowest IARC2 decile beats the highest one by a larger margin in year T+1, 8.1%, when 
we use Shanghai Stock Index returns and Shenzhen Stock Index returns separately for 
Shanghai and Shenzhen listed ﬁrms (MARET1), and 8.2% when we use a composite 
index of both exchanges as the market return (MARET2). In general, the size- and 
market-adjusted returns for the low IARC2 deciles are positive, whereas those for the 
high IARC2 deciles are negative. 
Table 5. Accounts Receivable and Future Stock Returns
SARET MARET1 MARET2
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+1 T+2 T+3
Low 3.9% 5.5% 6.3% 5.9% 4.9% 4.0% 5.9% 5.0% 4.1%
2 4.6% 1.0% -2.2% 5.3% 1.3% -0.8% 5.3% 1.3% -0.8%
3 1.0% -3.9% 2.4% 1.6% -2.7% 2.0% 1.6% -2.7% 2.1%
4 -0.1% -1.3% -0.5% 1.8% 1.1% -0.2% 1.8% 1.1% -0.1%
5 -1.7% 3.0% -1.4% -1.1% 3.8% -1.5% -1.1% 3.9% -1.4%
6 -0.5% -3.2% -2.9% 0.7% -4.1% -3.9% 0.7% -3.9% -3.8%
7 -4.7% 1.7% 1.2% -4.0% 5.5% 3.3% -4.1% 5.5% 3.3%
8 -1.1% 7.0% 4.7% -0.7% 11.6% 7.5% -0.8% 11.6% 7.6%
9 -3.2% -0.2% 0.3% -3.3% 3.5% 2.9% -3.3% 3.4% 2.9%
High -1.4% -0.4% 2.1% -2.2% 4.9% 7.4% -2.3% 4.7% 7.2%
Low-High
(t-value)
5.3% 5.9% 4.2% 8.1% 0.0% -3.5% 8.2% 0.4% -3.0%
(2.62)*** (1.30) (0.89) (3.94)*** (0.00) (-0.67) (3.97)*** (0.07) (-0.59)
Note: Each year between 2000 and 2004, we sort all sample ﬁrms into ten deciles based on IARC2, which is industry-
adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by total assets. We then track size-adjusted returns 
(SARET) and two measures of market-adjusted returns (MARET1 and MARET2) in three succeeding years. All 
observations for the same deciles between 2000 and 2004 are pooled together before means are calculated. ***, **, 
and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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In year T+2, although the lowest IARC2 decile ﬁrms still beat the highest IARC2 
decile ones, the diﬀerences are no longer signiﬁcant. In year T+3, the highest IARC2 
decile actually outperforms the lowest one in terms of market-adjusted returns, but 
the difference is insignificant.10 Therefore, although investors do not fully recognize 
the negative implications of IARC2 for future earnings, it takes only a year before the 
mispricing is statistically corrected. 
Figure 1. One-year-ahead Abnormal Returns of a Hedge Portfolio with Long Bottom Decile 
Accounts Receivable (IARC2) Stocks and Short Top Decile Accounts Receivable (IARC2) 
Stocks
Figure 1 plots the three measures of hedge returns (low minus high IARC2 deciles) 
by year. Only in one year (2002) do high IARC2 ﬁrms outperform low IARC2 ones in 
terms of size-adjusted returns during year T+1. All other hedge returns across the ﬁve 
years are positive, which indicates that the better performance of the low IARC2 decile 
in year T+1 is consistent over time. 
In the univariate analysis, other factors that could aﬀect future proﬁtability and stock 
returns are not controlled. Now, we turn to multivariate analysis.
10 In return tests, one is always left wondering whether risk has been suﬃciently controlled for before abnormal 
returns are recognized. However, little is known about the return structure in the Chinese market. Eun and 
Huang (2007) attempt to address this issue and conclude that size is still the major possible risk candidate in 
China, whereas beta is not. Hence, we do not use beta-adjusted returns.
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Table 6. Multivariate Analysis of Accounts Receivable, Future Earnings, and Future Stock 
Returns
AROA FRET
Constant -0.0073** 0.1924***
(0.047) (0.000)
RANKIARC2 -0.0054** -0.0378***
(0.038) (0.010)
RANKROA 0.0769*** 0.1289***
(0.000) (0.000)
RANKBM -0.0222*** 0.0360*
(0.000) (0.052)
RANKSIZE 0.0258*** 0.0856***
(0.000) (0.000)
RANKLEV -0.0105*** 0.0115
(0.000) (0.485)
RANKBETA -0.0252*
(0.084)
Year Eﬀect Controlled Controlled
Observations 4628 4861
Adjusted R-squared 0.3712 0.3822
Note: In this table, we regress the average ROA of three succeeding years and the one-year-ahead stock returns on the 
annual decile rank of IARC2, which is industry-adjusted accounts receivable aged more than 24 months divided by 
total assets, ROA, BM, SIZE, LEV, and BETA. Firm betas were obtained from the SinoFin database. Decile ranks 
are scaled between 0 and 1. The numbers in parentheses represent p-values, which are adjusted using the standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the ﬁrm level. ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
In the second column of Table 6, we regress the average of ROA in three succeeding 
years, AROA, on IARC2, current ROA, book-to-market ratio (BM), ﬁrm size (SIZE; 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets), and firm leverage (LEV). All 
independent variables are measured at the end of current year T. Instead of the original 
values of the independent variables, we use the decile ranks of each independent variable 
and scale the ranks between 0 and 1. The main reason we use decile ranks rather than 
the original values in our regressions is that the ﬁnancial data of Chinese listed ﬁrms 
tend to be highly skewed (Wang et al., 2007); that is, the distribution of ﬁnancial data 
has fat tails, and violates the normality assumption of ordinary least square regression. 
Using the rank decile as the independent variable also makes easier the interpretation of 
the regression coeﬃcients. 
After controlling for current proﬁtability and other ﬁrm characteristics, IARC2 is still 
signiﬁcantly negatively related to ROA in the three succeeding years, with a coeﬃcient 
of -0.0054 (p < 0.05). All else being equal, the highest IARC2 decile ﬁrms underperform 
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the lowest IARC2 decile ones by 0.54% every year over the three years. Given the low 
level of proﬁtability of our sample ﬁrms (Table 2), this diﬀerence is also economically 
signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient on ROA (0.0769) is signiﬁcantly positive. However, this coeﬃcient 
is quite low, which indicates faster mean reversion of proﬁtability, consistent with the 
ﬁnding of Niu et al. (2007). Finally, future proﬁtability is negatively related to book-to-
market ratio and ﬁrm leverage, and positively related to ﬁrm size, as expected. 
In the third column of Table 6, we regress the one-year-ahead stock returns (FRET) 
on the variables in the AROA regression, and the decile rank of ﬁrm beta. Firm betas 
are obtained from the SinoFin database and computed up to the end of year T. After 
controlling for the other firm characteristics, IARC2 is found to be significantly 
negatively related to future returns with a coeﬃcient of -0.0378 (p < 0.10). The highest 
IARC2 firms underperform the lowest IARC2 ones by 3.78% in the 12-month-
ahead period, all else being equal. Current ROA, book-to-market ratio, and ﬁrm size 
are positively related to future returns, whereas ﬁrm leverage is insigniﬁcantly related. 
However, beta is negatively related to future returns (p < 0.10). Given the noise in 
computing beta, we have no clear explanation for this relationship.
In summary, the univariate and multivariate analyses show that the magnitude of 
accounts receivable is negatively related to future proﬁtability and stock returns. The 
results are robust after controlling for firm characteristics that typically affect firm 
profitability and returns. This negative relationship does not appear to be driven by 
low earnings persistence (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001) as predicted by the accrual anomaly. 
The accrual anomaly would require high (low) current earnings for high (low) IARC2 
decile ﬁrms; however, high (low) IARC2 decile ﬁrms report low (high) current earnings. 
Thus, a more plausible explanation is that IARC2 captures the extent of self-dealing 
by controlling shareholders through trade credit. High IARC2 ﬁrms are those among 
which controlling shareholders tie up ﬁrm capital through a large magnitude of accounts 
receivable, which they do not pay back for a long time. Consequently, listed ﬁrms run 
into operating diﬃculties, which hurts their proﬁtability. When investors realize the self-
dealing nature of receivables, stock prices are depressed.
3.3. Bad Debt Allowance, Future Earnings, and Stock Returns
In this section, we examine the relation between bad debt allowance and future 
earnings as well as stock returns. The literature has identified two main reasons that 
listed ﬁrms make a bad debt allowance (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; McNichols and Wilson, 
1988; Chen et al., 2004). The first reason is economic – firms make an allowance 
for bad debts or impairment losses when assets lose value, and the second is earnings 
management. Asset impairment or bad debt allowance is made without economic loss to 
shuﬄe earnings across accounting periods. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to diﬀerentiate between these two reasons with 
regard to the incentive among Chinese ﬁrms to make a bad debt allowance. Thus, we 
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focus on the industry adjusted ratio of bad debt allowance to accounts receivable aged 
more than 24 months (IARP2).11 We believe that this measure can also capture the 
extent to which controlling shareholders expropriate listed ﬁrms through trade credit. 
First, the Ministry of Finance policies on making a bad debt allowance discourage 
listed firms from making such an allowance against receivables due from controlling 
shareholders and related parties. The policies clearly indicate that the employees of the 
listed ﬁrms who extend the trade credit will be held responsible for any losses. Second, 
making a bad debt allowance against receivables due from controlling shareholders 
would immediately damage the reputation of the controlling shareholder and listed 
ﬁrm, for it would send a signal to the market that the party that controls the listed ﬁrm 
can actually take money from the ﬁrm without intending to pay it back. Therefore, the 
allowance listed ﬁrms have already made is likely against receivables due from unrelated 
parties. By sorting based on IARP2, we also capture the extent of self-dealing through 
trade credit: the higher is the IARP2, the lower is the amount of receivables due from 
controlling shareholders.
Table 7. Bad Debt Allowance, Future Earnings, and Stock Returns
ROA CF
T T+1 T+2 T+3 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Low 0.023 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.042 0.044 0.052 0.052
2 0.021 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.040 0.043 0.042 0.046
3 0.021 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.051
4 0.021 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.042
5 0.023 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.043 0.045 0.052 0.044
6 0.021 0.014 0.012 0.007 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.046
7 0.024 0.013 0.014 0.005 0.053 0.047 0.052 0.048
8 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.016 0.047 0.057 0.055 0.051
9 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.015 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.057
High 0.012 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.069
Low-High
(t-value)
-0.011 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.016 0.017
-2.29** 2.69*** 3.13*** 3.34*** 4.67*** 4.52*** 2.90*** 2.72***
11 Using the ratio of bad debt allowance to total receivables, receivables aged more than 12 months, and 
receivables aged more than 36 months produces similar results.
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SARET MARET1 MARET2
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+1 T+2 T+3
Low -1.7% -3.1% -1.7% -0.9% -2.1% -0.6% -0.9% -2.1% -0.7%
2 -0.3% -2.3% 0.1% -0.5% -2.0% -0.3% -0.5% -2.0% -0.3%
3 -2.7% -0.1% -4.1% -2.8% 0.0% -3.2% -2.8% 0.0% -3.2%
4 -0.4% -2.1% 0.6% -0.7% -1.6% 1.6% -0.6% -1.7% 1.4%
5 -3.0% 0.3% -0.7% -2.7% 0.7% -0.1% -2.7% 0.7% -0.1%
6 1.1% -1.7% -0.2% 1.7% -0.8% 0.5% 1.7% -0.8% 0.4%
7 -1.3% 3.2% -2.9% -0.4% 3.9% -2.4% -0.4% 3.9% -2.5%
8 0.0% -1.7% -1.8% 0.5% -0.8% -0.8% 0.4% -0.8% -0.9%
9 2.7% 0.2% -0.5% 3.8% 1.4% 1.5% 3.7% 1.4% 1.4%
High 3.3% 2.5% 0.4% 5.1% 3.9% 2.1% 5.0% 3.9% 2.0%
Low-High
(t-value)
5.0% 5.7% 2.1% 6.0% 6.0% 2.7% 6.0% 6.0% 2.7%
2.47** 2.25** 0.65 2.88*** 2.36** 0.80 2.88*** 2.35** 0.80
Note: Each year between 2000 and 2004, we sort all sample ﬁrms into ten deciles based on IARP2, which is the industry-
adjusted ratio of bad debt allowance to accounts receivable aged more than 24 months. We then track ROA, cash 
earnings (CF), size-adjusted returns (SARET), and two measures of market-adjusted returns (MARET1 and 
MARET2) in three succeeding years. All observations for the same deciles between 2000 and 2004 are pooled 
together before means are calculated. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 7 reports ROA and CF from year T to year T+3 and the size-adjusted and 
market-adjusted returns from year T+1 to year T+3 for the ten deciles sorted based on 
the IARP2.
In year T, IARP2 is negatively related to ROA. The ROA of the highest IARP2 
ﬁrms (large allowance ﬁrms) is 1.1% lower than that of the lowest IARP2 ﬁrms (small 
allowance ﬁrms), and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. It appears that the earnings 
power of large allowance ﬁrms is weaker. However, looking at cash earnings (CF in year T), 
the large allowance ﬁrms actually report greater cash earnings by 2.7%. This indicates 
that ﬁrms that are willing to make an allowance are not poorly performing ﬁrms. 
In year T+1 through year T+3, large allowance ﬁrms outperform small allowance 
ones by a signiﬁcant margin, whether we use the accruals measure of earnings (ROA) or 
cash measure of earnings (CF). It is worth noting that the magnitude of outperformance 
in ROA in years T+1 to T+3 is quite large, and there does not appear to be an automatic 
reversion of earnings when the low earnings in year T are artificially low because of 
earnings management through making a greater allowance. 
Large allowance ﬁrms outperform small allowance ones in year T+1 and year T+2, 
whether we use size-adjusted or market-adjusted returns, which is consistent with 
the better earnings performance of these firms. In unreported regressions, IARP2 is 
positively related to future earnings performance and stock returns even after we control 
for other ﬁrm characteristics.
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In summary, the bad debt allowance tests presented in this section also support the 
notion that trade credit is used by controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders, and that listed ﬁrms and minority shareholders suﬀer as a consequence.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the self-dealing nature of trade credit from listed ﬁrms to 
their controlling shareholders. We posit that given China’s sub par credit history and 
weak investor protection environment, trade credit could be exploited by controlling 
shareholders to siphon oﬀ beneﬁts from minority shareholders.
We need to acknowledge that differentiating fair trade credit from self-dealing 
through trade credit is diﬃcult. Trade credit is extended to trade partners through actual 
transactions, whether or not the transaction is conducted on an arm’s length basis. 
Outsiders have virtually no way to directly judge whether the trade price and credit 
terms are reasonable. Similarly, it is diﬃcult to judge whether or not receivables will 
become uncollectible, as trade partners are still solvent. However, one thing is certain: 
long overdue receivables, even if ultimately repaid, hurt the interests of listed ﬁrms, as 
they serve as interest-free loans to trade partners. 
Nevertheless, the institutional analyses and case studies that we present in this 
paper lead us to believe that a great magnitude of receivables is highly likely to be a 
manifestation of self-dealing. Indeed, we ﬁnd that a great magnitude of receivables is 
negatively related to future earnings and stock returns in both a statistically and an 
economically signiﬁcant way, which supports the self-dealing argument. 
Loans from listed ﬁrms to controlling shareholders have been at the center of investor 
protection in China. In the past, more attention was given to non-operating loans (eg, 
those reported as other receivables) from listed ﬁrms to controlling shareholders (Jiang 
et al., 2009). The problem became so severe, however, that the State Council had to 
intervene in 2005 with both legal and administrative measures. By the end of 2006, 
direct non-operating loans to controlling shareholders were mostly settled. However, the 
incentive to engage in self-dealing remains. Hence, it is possible that when one channel 
of self-dealing is closed, controlling shareholders just find another one. Our paper 
identiﬁes such an alternative channel and draws the attention of investors and regulators 
to it.
A number of related questions need to be addressed in future research. First, as 
ﬁnancial disclosure improves, we may be able to collect detailed data on trade credit 
extended to controlling shareholders and the allowance made against it, which would 
increase the power of the tests. Second, and more importantly, further research is needed 
to identify the market mechanisms that are required to curtail self-dealing through 
trade credit. Regulators can prohibit other receivables, but they cannot prohibit trade 
receivables. Thus, better mechanisms need to be put in place to guarantee fairness in 
trade, the integrity of the credit terms, and the timely payback of receivables.
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